Opération espionnage : Forces spéciales australiennes en Afrique

Un article récent du quotidien australien The Age révèle que l’armée et les services de renseignement australiens sont de plus en plus liés, et qu’un escadron secret est employé à travers l’Afrique pour des activités d’espionnage au profit des États-Unis. « Les renseignements recueillis par les forces spéciales australiennes dans des pays comme le Kenya sont transférés dans des bases de données qu’utilisent les États-Unis et leurs alliés en Afrique. (Rafael Epstein et Dylan Welch, Secret SAS squadron sent to spy in Africa, The Age, 13 mars 2012.)

Bien que l’existence du 4 Squadron du SAS (Forces spéciales) n’ait jamais été officiellement admise, elle est confirmée. L’ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères, Kevin Rudd, a demandé son déploiement en Libye l’an dernier, une requête à laquelle se sont opposés des représentants de la Défense, selon The Age. L’article ajoute qu’il a été « confirmé que les troupes de l’escadron ont mené des douzaines d’opérations secrètes durant la dernière année dans des pays africains, dont le Zimbabwe, le Nigeria et le Kenya ».

Fait intéressant, The Age rapporte que le quatrième escadron a été créé au moment où les agents du renseignement australien ont reçu la permission de « porter des armes pour l’autodéfense et de participer à des opérations violentes, à condition de ne pas avoir eux-mêmes recours à la force ». Les soldats « devaient agir à titre de gardes du corps élites et d’éclaireurs pour les agents de l’ASIS [Services secrets de renseignement australiens] ». The Age note que la création de l’escadron « reflète le modèle étasunien, où l’armée et le renseignement ont des liens plus étroits ».

Ce type d’armée clandestine est en fait ce qu’envisagent les États-Unis afin de réduire, dit-on, le coût des opérations militaires dans le monde entier.

En plus d’autres opérations dans les pays africains, le 4e escadron « a évalué les contrôles frontaliers africains [et] exploré les sites d’atterrissage pour d’éventuelles interventions militaires ». Les soldats travaillent en civil et « en dehors des cadres légaux international et australien ».

Le manque de protection légale des soldats soulève des inquiétudes abordées dans l’article. L’aspect illégal de ce genre d’opération en vertu du droit international ne l’est pas. Pourtant, cela constitue une violation de la souveraineté territoriale des États.

Les Étasuniens utilisent le terme « combattant ennemi » pour décrire les membres d’Al-Qaïda et d’autres terroristes présumés et ils ont refusé l’application des Conventions de Genève. Selon leurs explications, la loi de la guerre requiert des combattants légaux le port de l’uniforme ou d’un signe distinctif. On peut assumer que si des soldats clandestins, sans uniforme ni signe distinctif, étaient capturés en sol étranger, ils pourraient, l’instar des agents d’Al-Qaïda, être décrits comme des « combattants ennemis ».

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Secret SAS squadron sent to spy in Africa

Rafael Epstein and Dylan Welch
The Age -March 13, 2012

A secret squadron of Australian troops conducting covert operations in
Africa has blurred the line between soldiering and spying with
potentially disastrous consequences.

A secret squadron of Australian SAS soldiers has been operating at large
in Africa, performing work normally done by spies, in an unannounced and
possibly dangerous expansion of Australia’s foreign military engagement.

The deployment of the SAS’s 4 Squadron – the existence of which has
never been publicly confirmed – has put the special forces unit at the
outer reaches of Australian and international law.

The Age has confirmed that troopers from the squadron have mounted
dozens of secret operations over the past year in African nations
including Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Kenya.

They have been out of uniform and not accompanied by Australian Secret
Intelligence Service officers with whom undercover SAS forces are
conventionally deployed.

It is believed the missions have involved gathering intelligence on
terrorism and scoping rescue strategies for Australian civilians trapped
by kidnapping or civil war.

But the operations have raised serious concerns within the Australian
military and intelligence community because they involve countries where
Australia is not at war.

There are also concerns within the SAS that the troopers do not have
adequate legal protection or contingency plans if they are captured.
 »They have all the espionage skills but without [ASIS’s] legal cover, »
said one government source.

In a comment relayed to government officials, one soldier said:  »What
happens if we get caught? »

Australian National University professor Hugh White, a former deputy
secretary of Defence, said:  »Such an operation deprives the soldier of
a whole lot of protections, including their legal status and, in a
sense, their identity as a soldier. I think governments should think
extremely carefully before they ask soldiers to do that. »

Despite the dangers, then foreign minister Kevin Rudd last year asked
for troopers from 4 Squadron to be used in Libya during that country’s
conflict. His plan was thwarted by opposition from Defence Minister
Stephen Smith and chief of the Defence Force General David Hurley.

Both Mr Smith and General Hurley declined to be interviewed about this
story.

SAS 4 Squadron is based at Swan Island, near Queenscliff, a
high-security defence facility that has doubled in size over the past
decade, in part to accommodate the new squadron.

The squadron was formally raised in 2005 by the Howard government, but
The Age has learnt that its new intelligence-focused role was authorised
in late 2010 or early last year by Mr Smith.

The SAS is also at the forefront of gender reform in the Australian
military, with six female soldiers being trained in the United States
for their work with 4 Squadron.

Collecting intelligence overseas without using violence is the main
function of ASIS, which was created in 1952 but not officially
acknowledged until 1977.

Since the mid-1980s, ASIS officers have been refused permission to carry
weapons or use violence, but in 2004 the Howard government amended
legislation to allow them to have weapons for self-defence and to
participate in violent operations provided the officers themselves do
not use force.

It was around that time that the creation of the fourth SAS squadron was
authorised, with its soldiers expected to be an elite version of
bodyguards and scouts for ASIS intelligence officers.

The African operations by 4 Squadron initially centred on possible
rescue scenarios for endangered Australian citizens, such as freelance
journalist Nigel Brennan, who was held by Somali rebels.

The soldiers have also assessed African border controls, explored
landing sites for possible military interventions and developed
scenarios for evacuating Australians, as well as assessing local
politics. ASIS officers are legally permitted to carry false Australian
passports and, if arrested, can deny who they are employed by. ADF
members on normal operations cannot carry false identification and
cannot deny which government they work for.

While the SAS has worked alongside Australia’s intelligence agencies for
decades, the creation of a dedicated squadron mirrors the US model,
where the military and the intelligence services have closer links.

That relationship has resulted in the growing importance of the US Joint
Special Operations Command, whose soldiers killed al-Qaeda leader Osama
bin Laden in Pakistan last year.

Some staff within the ADF’s special operations command see 4 Squadron
detracting from what they believe is the main effort – the war in
Afghanistan and the counterterrorism teams on the east and west coasts
of Australia, manned by soldiers from the 2nd Commando Regiment and the
SAS respectively. But others argue it is vital to Australia’s
contribution to the American fight against al-Qaeda – particularly in
the Horn of Africa. US intelligence believes many second-tier al-Qaeda
fighters and leaders from the Afghanistan and Pakistan region have fled
there.

The intelligence gathered by the Australian soldiers in countries such
as Kenya all flows into databases used by the US and its allies in Africa.

Australia’s security service ASIO is also increasingly concerned by the
domestic threat posed by Somalia-based terror group al-Shabaab. ASIO
holds concerns that a small group within Australia’s growing Somali
community is sending money to al-Shabaab.